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TAX TREATMENT OF LUMP-SUM
DISTRIBUTIONS FROM PREVIOUSLY
QUALIFIED EMPLOYEE
PENSION PLANS
Most corporations compensate their employees through employee
benefits as well as basic wages and salaries.1 One such benefit, the pen-
sion plan,2 is designed to prepare the employee for the reduction or loss
of income that attends retirement. The employer contributes pre-tax
funds in the name of the employee, and the employee can usually supple-
ment that amount through direct contributions of his own. For federal
tax purposes, these private pension plans are classified as either qualified
or nonqualified.3
Contributions to a qualified tax-exempt pension fund benefit both
the employer and the employee. The employer contributions are deduct-
ible within the limits set forth in sections 404(a)(1)-(3) of the Internal
Revenue Code (the Code). The employee can defer income taxes on
1. As of December 1985, the total dollars invested in private pension plans had reached $1.4
trillion. The vast majority of these funds were invested in qualified, rather than nonqualified plans.
Telephone interview with the Office of Policy and Research, U.S. Department of Labor (Feb. 4,
1986).
2. As used in this note, "pension plan" means a program or fund established by an employer
for the benefit of his eligible employees, or their beneficiaries, over a period of years after retirement.
Examples include profit-sharing, stock-bonus, and defined-benefit plans. This note does not specifi-
cally address Keogh plans, individual retirement accounts, or annuities.
3. Whether an employee is a participant in a qualified plan is governed by the interaction of
three sections of the Internal Revenue Code. Section 401 sets out the required vesting, coverage, and
funding levels. Unless these requirements are met, the plan is considered nonqualified.
The taxability of the benefits from a qualified pension plan is set out in section 402(a):
[Tihe amount actually distributed... [from a trust] described in section 401(a) which is
exempt from tax under section 501(a) shall be taxable... in the year in which so distrib-
uted.
I.R.C. § 402(a)(1) (1982). The section then describes the preferential methods of taxing a lump-sum
distribution, including capital gains treatment, forward averaging, and rollover treatment.
The tax treatment for a distribution from a nonqualified pension plan is set out in section
402(b):
Contributions to an employees' trust made by an employer during a taxable year of the
employer which ends within or with a taxable year of the trust for which the trust is not
exempt from tax under section 501(a) shall be included in the gross income of the employee
.... The amount actually distributed or made available to any distributee by any such
trust shall be taxable ... in the year in which so distributed or made available ....
Id. § 401(b) (emphasis added). The main qualification requirements under section 401(a) are that
the plan be for the exclusive benefit of employees or their beneficiaries, id. § 401(a)(2), and that it
does not discriminate in favor of highly compensated employees. Id. § 401(a)(4).
These provisions were not substantially modified by the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No.
99-514, 100 Stat. 2085.
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those funds contributed until distribution and, usually, can contribute
additional funds up to a certain percentage. These two features allow
tax-exempt accumulation of the employee's funds in preparation for re-
tirement.4 When the employee pays taxes on the funds received, he can
choose (1) capital-gains treatment for any portion of the funds contrib-
uted before 1974,5 (2) five-year forward averaging for funds contributed
after 1974,6 or (3) rollover of the funds into another qualifying pension
fund or an IRA.7
The employee has these tax options at retirement if the company's
pension fund has remained qualified. Federal courts are split, however,
over whether the options should be available if the employer's fund has
become disqualified. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit and the Tax Court have allowed preferential tax treatment for
funds contributed before the disqualification date. The United States
Courts of Appeals for the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits have rejected
this approach. Instead, these courts tie the tax treatment to the date of
distribution. Since all funds will necessarily be distributed only after the
disqualification date, preferential tax treatment is wholly denied under
this approach.
Typically, pension plans are disqualified retroactively for failing to
meet coverage or contribution requirements. New top-heavy plan rules
introduced by Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 and by
4. The advantages to the employee of accumulating retirement funds on a tax-free basis are
significant. If, for example,
an employee was age thirty when he entered the plan and employer contributions were
made at $2,000 per year and grew at a 12% rate of return, then the total benefit would be
$996,926 at age sixty-five. However, if the employee received his salary (which would be
taxed) and then invested $2,000 per year at the same 12% rate in a regular savings account,
then the total after tax benefit would be $118,121. Increase the rate of return and yearly
contributions and the difference between taxed and tax-free growth will become even more
remarkable.
Comment, How to Accomplish a Successful Tax-Free Pension Plan Rollover, 8 PEPPERDINE L. REV.
933, 937 n.26 (1981).
5. This option is available, on an increasingly limited basis, through 1991. The Tax Reform
Act of 1986 established special transition rules phasing out capital gains treatment over a five-year
period beginning January 1, 1987. This is accomplished by applying a phase-out percentage to the
amount that would have been treated as long-term capital gains under prior law. See I.R.C.
§ 402(a)(2), (e)(4) (1982 & Supp. III 1985), as amended by Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-
514, § 1122(b)(1), (h)(4), 100 Stat. 2085, 2466, 2471.
Individuals who have attained age 50 before January 1, 1986 are allowed under the transition
rules to elect capital gains treatment with respect to a lump-sum distribution, without regard to the
five-year phase-out plan. The pre-1974 portion of the distribution will be taxed at a rate of 20
percent. I.R.C. § 402(a)(2), (e)(4) (1982), as amended by Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-
514, § I122(b)(1), (h)(3)i 100 Stat. 2085, 2466, 2470-71.
6. Individuals who are 59 1/2 or older may elect to use five-year forward averaging with
regard to a single lump sum received. I.R.C. § 402(e)(1)(c) (1982), as amended by Tax Reform Act
of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1122(a)(2), 100 Stat. 2085, 2466.
7. I.R.C. § 402(a)(5) (1982).
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the Tax Reform Act of 1986 threaten to cause an increase in the number
of plan disqualifications.8 With potentially more disqualifications, the
tax treatment of lump-sum distributions from previously qualified em-
ployee pension plans could affect a greater range of taxpayers.
This note discusses the controversies surrounding this tax treatment.
First, it discusses the tax legislation governing employee pension plans,
with special attention to the taxation of lump-sum distributions. 9 It then
examines the conflicting judicial approaches to resolving the issue of dis-
tribution taxation.10 Finally, it analyzes the courts' interpretations of
sections 402(a) and 402(b), the legislative history of those sections, and
relevant equitable considerations.1 The note concludes that the Code
and applicable Treasury regulations require the denial of preferential tax
treatment for any distribution made after the plan is disqualified, despite
the possible inequities that may be worked on the individual employee.
I. EMPLOYEE PENSION PLANS AND THE CODE
A. Tax Treatment of Lump-Sum Distributions from Employee
Pension Plans.
Since the colonial period, Americans have attempted to retain funds
during their most productive years in preparation for the time when they
would be too old or infirm to support themselves.12 In modern times,
employers have aided employees in this effort by establishing employee
pension funds. The early pension plans were largely unregulated. In
1926, however, the federal government sought to encourage the growth
of private pension plans by legislating favorable tax treatment for the
distributions of private pension plans. The 1926 Act allowed employees
to defer taxation on contributions to a pension trust until the funds were
distributed back to them, usually at retirement.' 3 Since 1926, Congress
has made piecemeal modifications to the laws governing pension fund
distributions.14
8. Musick, TC Allows Partial Favorable Treatment on Distributions from Formerly Qual/ifed
Plans, 62 J. TAx'N 134, 134 (1985).
9. See infra notes 12-32 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 33-71 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 72-92 and accompanying text.
12. See B. FRANKLIN, POOR RICHARD'S ALMANAC (1754) ("For Age and Want save while
you may; No morning Sun lasts a whole Day.").
13. Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 219(f), 44 Stat. 9, 33-34.
14. The Revenue Act of 1928 was the first to make employer contributions to a fund deductible.
Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, § 23(q), 45 Stat. 791, 802. The Revenue Act of 1938 more strictly
defined the requirements for establishing and operating an exempt trust. Revenue Act of 1938, ch.
289, § 165(a), 52 Stat. 447, 518.
In the Revenue Act of 1942, Congress redefined these requirements, Revenue Act of 1942, ch.
619, § 162(a), 56 Stat. 798, 862-63, revised the rules regarding deductibility of contributions, id.
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The term "lump-sum distribution" was first introduced in section
162(a) of the Revenue Act of 1942. The 1942 Act conferred capital gains
§ 162(b), 56 Stat. at 863-66, and provided for capital gains treatment of distributions for the first
time. Id. § 162(a), 56 Stat. at 863. Although the House saw a need for extensive revision of the rules
governing employee trusts prior to the passage of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, H.R. REP. No.
1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 42-46 (1954), the Senate refused to adopt any sweeping changes and
adhered to the pattern established in previous legislation. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 53-
54 (1954).
The Tax Reform Act of 1969 amended the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 and included a
provision to limit the capital gains treatment of certain types of plan distributions. Tax Reform Act
of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 515(a), 83 Stat. 487, 643-44.
Not until 1974, with the passage of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA),
Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974), did Congress make a comprehensive effort to remedy the
inadequacies in pension coverage, vesting, and funding. ERISA's breadth necessitated the revision
of most existing pension plans.
ERISA provided specific definitions for employee benefit plans, and divided employee pension
plans into two categories: (a) defined benefit plans (plans that specify the benefit to the employee),
ERISA § 1015, I.R.C. § 414(j) (1982); and (b) defined contribution plans (plans that specify the
contribution by the employer). ERISA § 1015, I.R.C. § 414(i) (1982).
ERISA also established detailed qualification requirements for tax-exempt pension trusts.
There are three kinds of minimum qualification standards:
(1) Plan participation requirements These specify the length of time an employer can require an
employee to wait before becoming a participant in the pension or profit-sharing plan. I.R.C.
§ 410(a)(1) (West Supp. 1986); id. § 414(a) (1982). Additionally, the plan cannot discriminate in
favor of officers, shareholders, or highly compensated employees in the allocation of benefits to be
received or contributions to be made. Id. § 401(a)(4) (West Supp. 1986); id. § 410(b)(1)(B) (1982).
(2) Vesting requirements. These specify the length of time an employee must wait before acquiring
a nonforfeitable interest in the plan. Id. § 411 (West Supp. 1986). For example, an employee must
be at least 50% vested at the end of ten years of service under all three of the vesting schedules set
out in the Code. Id. § 411(a)(2) (1982).
(3) Contribution requirementm These specify the minimum contributions an employer must make
to the plan. Id. § 412 (West Supp. 1986). Generally, the yearly contribution to a qualified pension
plan must be sufficient to cover the amounts that will be payable upon employee retirement. Id.
For a more detailed discussion of the qualification requirements established by ERISA, see
Comment, supra note 4, at 935 n.13.
Since ERISA was enacted, Congress has made almost yearly adjustments to pension plan legis-
lation. Three recent modifications were the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub.
L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324, the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494, and
the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085. The Tax Equity and Fiscal
Responsibility Act sought to equalize the tax treatment of pensions of self-employed persons by
bringing Keogh Plan treatment in line with that of corporate plans. See Stokes & Rasmussen,
Direct Transfer of Assets Between Plans Often More Advantageous than IRA Rollover, 33 TAX'N FOR
AccT. 374, 377 (1984). It also introduced the provisions applicable to top-heavy pension plans, i.e.,
those that benefit primarily key personnel. See Laibstain & Lander, Benefits, Contributions, and
Distributions of Qualified Plans All Affected by the New Law, 33 TAX'N FOR AcCT. 76, 76-77 (1984).
The Deficit Reduction Act altered the treatment of distributions made prior to the time the recipient
reaches 59 1/2, rollovers of partial distributions, spousal rollovers and section 403(b) plan rollovers.
See Sollee & Stone, New Law Brings Major Changes Affecting Pre-59 1/2 Distributions and Rollovers,
61 J. TAX'N 130, 130-33 (1984). The Tax Reform Act again altered the rules regarding discrimina-
tory coverage and highly compensated employees, and provided new minimum vesting schedules. It
also altered the treatment of distributions from qualified plans and changed the limits on employer
deductions for contributions to qualified plans. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100
Stat. 2085.
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treatment on all lump-sum distributions defined as "total distributions
... paid to the distributee within one taxable year," if made "on account
of the employee's separation from the service."' 15 Today, the Code de-
fines a lump-sum distribution as the payment or distribution, within one
taxable year, of an employee's credit balance with a qualified plan,
16
made (a) on account of the employee's death, 17 (b) after the employee
attains age 59 1/2,18 (c) on account of the employee's separation from the
service, 19 or (d) after the participant has become disabled.20
Upon receipt, a distribution may be taxed in one of three ways:21 the
capital gains method for all pre-1974 contributions,22 five-year forward
averaging of the post-1974 contributions, 23 or rollover of the distribution
into another qualified pension fund or into an IRA.24 The appropriate
choice depends not only on the date of contribution (pre-1974 or post-
1974), but also on a host of other factors, including how close the em-
ployee is to retirement and how much other income the employee expects
For a more detailed presentation of the development of employee pension plan legislation, see 6
M. WEINSTEIN, MERTENS LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 25B.02 (1985).
15. Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, § 162(a), 56 Stat. 798, 863.
16. The main qualification requirements of a qualified plan are that it be for the exclusive bene-
fit of the employees or their beneficiaries, and that it does not discriminate in favor of officers, share-
holders, or highly compensated employees. For a discussion of the test the IRS uses in determining
whether a plan is nondiscriminatory, see Stuart, How to Prevent Disqualification of a Plan for Failure
to Meet the Coverage Test, 27 TAx'N FOR AccT. 240 (1981).
17. I.R.C. § 402(e)(4)(A)(i) (West Supp. 1986).
18. Id. § 402(e)(4)(A)(ii).
19. Id. § 402(e)(4)(A)(iii). For a discussion of the meaning of "separation from service," see
United States v. Johnson, 331 F.2d 943, 945-54 (5th Cir. 1964); Hessenthaler & Lohwater, Lump-
sum Distributions: Determining When "Separation from Service" Occurs, 10 TAx'N FOR LAW. 272,
272-78 (1982).
20. I.R.C. § 402(e)(4)(A)(iv) (1982). An individual is disabled if "he is unable to engage in any
substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment
which can be expected to result in death or to be of long-continued and indefinite duration." Id.
§ 72(m)(7).
21. See infra notes 22-24 and accompanying text. In some instances, a combination of these
methods may be used; partial distributions may also qualify. 5 Fed. Taxes (P-H) 19,196, 19,201
(1987).
22. I.R.C. § 402(a)(2), (e)(4) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). However, the Tax Reform Act of 1986,
Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1122(b)(1), (h)(4), 100 Stat. 2085, 2466, 2471, phases out capital gains treat-
ment over five years beginning January 1, 1987.
23. I.R.C. § 402(e)(1)(C) (1982), as amended by Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514,
§ 1122(e)(2), 100 Stat. 2085, 2466.
24. I.R.C. §§ 402(a)(5)(A), 408(d)(3)(A), (13) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). The IRA alternative
has two major disadvantages: (1) distributions from an IRA are taxed as ordinary income, and (2) a
10% penalty is generally imposed if funds are withdrawn early. See Comment, supra note 4, at 943
n.69.
The Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § I122(e)(1), 100 Stat. 2085, 2469, also
provides that partial distributions may be rolled over only if the distribution is made on account of
the death of the employee, on account of the employee's separation from service, or after the em-
ployee has been disabled.
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to receive that tax year and in retirement. In choosing the method of
taxation, the employee generally will seek to maximize after-tax cash
flow during retirement.2 5
B. Pension Plan Disqualification.
Disqualification of a pension plan occurs when the IRS determines
that the plan does not meet the necessary requirements for exempt status.
The defect can be either in the form or in the operation of the plan. In
rectifying defects in the pension's form, i.e., its provisions, ample oppor-
tunity is available for amending the plan.26 Generally speaking, section
401(b) and its regulations provide greater latitude for retroactive amend-
ment to the form of a plan than was permitted prior to ERISA.27
It is more frequently the operation of a pension plan that causes
disqualification. 28 When disqualification does occur because of a viola-
tion of this kind, the disqualification is often retroactive, i.e., the plan is
considered disqualified as of the date of the violation, not the date of the
adjudication.2 9 In such case, the loss of all preferential tax treatment is
25. For discussions of the factors that should be weighed when making the choice, see Esterces,
Ten-year.Averaging Election for Lump-sum Distributions Not Always the Best Approach, 9 TAX'N FOR
LAW. 272 (1981); Hoyt, Choosing Between Special Ten-year Averaging and Deferring Tax Through a
Rollover, 60 J. TAX'N 90 (1984); Stokes & Rasmussen, Direct Transfer of Assets Between Plans Often
More Advantageous Than IRA Rollover, 33 TAX'N FOR AccT. 374 (1984).
26. I.R.C. § 401(b) (1982) provides:
A stock bonus, pension, profit-sharing, or annuity plan shall be considered as satisfying the
requirements of subsection (a) for the period beginning with the date on which it was put
into effect, or for the period beginning with the earlier of the date on which there was
adopted or put into effect any amendment which caused the plan to fail to satisfy such
requirements, and ending with the time prescribed by law for filing the return of the em-
ployer for his taxable year in which such plan or amendment was adopted (including exten-
sions thereof) or such later time as the Secretary may designate, if all provisions of the plan
which are necessary to satisfy such requirements are in effect by the end of such period and
have been made effective for all purposes for the whole of such period.
Id.
27. See Stogel & Ervin, Keeping the Qualified Pension Plan Qualified and Recognizing the Tax
Effects of Disqualification, 1977 WASH. U.L.Q. 565, 567-70 (describing disqualification process
before and after ERISA).
28. Not every violation results in disqualification; ERISA imposes excise taxes for less grievous
violations. Under ERISA, specific excise tax penalties are tied to certain prohibited transactions.
I.R.C. § 4975(a), (c) (1982). The Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1121(a)(1), 100
Stat. 2085, 2464, imposes an excise tax for another transgression that had previously triggered plan
disqualification: failure to satisfy minimum distribution requirements.
29. See, eg., Benbow v. Commissioner, 774 F.2d 740 (7th Cir. 1985).
The Commissioner has considerable discretion in applying decisions retroactively. See I.R.C.
§ 7805(b) (1982). A court must uphold a retroactive application unless the application constitutes
an abuse of discretion. See Boggs v. Commissioner, 784 F.2d 1166, 1169 (4th Cir. 1986); see also
Automobile Club v. Commissioner, 353 U.S. 180, 184-85 (1957) (similarly interpreting the predeces-
sor of section 7805(b)).
The Commissioner's discretion has been circumscribed to some extent, however. The State-
ment of Procedural Rules, 26 C.F.R. § 601.201(l)(5) (1986), provides:
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particularly burdensome for the employee.30 Once an adverse ruling has
been made by the IRS and the employee has exhausted his administrative
remedies, the employee's only option is to seek a declaratory judgment
that the plan is qualified 3' or bring a suit for refund.3 2
II. THE CONFLICTING INTERPRETATIONS OF SECTION 402(a)(2)
It is in the midst of ever-continuing congressional action that the
courts have had to wrestle with appeals from employees whose pension
trusts have been disqualified. These appeals center around the issue of
whether section 402(a)(2) confers preferential treatment upon employer
contributions made to a qualified trust if the trust's qualified status is
later revoked.
In Greenwald v. Commissioner, 3 3 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit held that pension funds contributed prior to dis-
qualification should receive preferential treatment. Subsequent district
court and Tax Court decisions 34 followed the Greenwald holding. How-
Except in rare or unusual circumstances, the revocation or modification of a ruling will not
be applied retroactively with respect to the taxpayer to whom the ruling was originally
issued or to a taxpayer whose tax liability was directly involved in such ruling if (i) there
has been no misstatement or omission of material facts, (ii) the facts subsequently devel-
oped are not materially different from the facts on which the ruling was based, (iii) there
has been no change in the applicable law, (iv) the ruling was originally issued with respect
to a prospective or proposed transaction, and (v) the taxpayer directly involved in the
ruling acted in good faith in reliance upon the ruling and the retroactive revocation would
be to his detriment.
The Commissioner is required to abide by 26 C.F.R. § 601.201(l)(5) because it is "reasonably
based on" I.R.C. § 7805(b). Lansons, Inc. v. Commissioner, 622 F.2d 774, 776-77 (4th Cir. 1980).
For additional information on retroactivity and revocations, see Knox, Retroactive Qualifica-
tion, Disqualification of Employee Retirement Plans, 61 J. TAX'N 84 (1984); Comment, Limits on
Retroactive Decision Making by the Internal Revenue Service: Redefining Abuse of Discretion Under
Section 7805(b), 23 UCLA L. REv. 529 (1976).
30. If the employee is not fully vested upon disqualification and his vested interest subsequently
increases, he must include in his income for the taxable year the change in the value of his share of
the trust assets (less any liabilities, including taxes). Treas. Reg. § 1.402(b)-l(b)(2) (1978). If contri-
butions are made over time after the plan is disqualified, the employee must report as income the
portion of the contributions made during the taxable year that are vested in addition to the increase
of the value of his vested interest. Treas. Reg. § 1.402(b)-l(a), (b)(4) (1978).
If the disqualification is retroactive, the employee would also be required to pay interest on any
additional taxes. As one commentator notes:
Disqualification of a plan alters its function; rather than being a "fringe benefit," it almost
immediately becomes a detriment, because the employee must pay income taxes with his
own aftertax dollars without receiving any funds from the plan. In addition, the em-
ployee's tax return will be subjected to at least a cursory IRS audit.
Stogel & Ervin, supra note 27, at 589 n.l 19.
31. I.R.C. § 7476 (1982).
32. I.R.C. § 7422 (1982).
33. 366 F.2d 538, 541 (2d Cir. 1966).
34. See Hesse v. United States, 81-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9153, at 86,212 (E.D. Mo. 1980);
Dudinsky v. United States, 78-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9688, at 85,300 (M.D. Fla. 1978); Pitt v.
United States, 75-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) t 9472, at 87,245 (M.D. Fla. 1975); Sturdivant v. Commis-
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ever, in Woodson v. Commissioner,35 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit rejected the Greenwald approach and held that
funds distributed from a disqualified trust were not entitled to favorable
tax treatment, even if contributed while the pension fund was tax-ex-
empt. In essence, the Fifth Circuit tied the availability of preferential tax
treatment to the time of fund distribution, rather than contribution. 36
The United States Courts of Appeals for the Sixth 37 and Seventh 38 Cir-
cuits have agreed with the Woodson approach. A thorough analysis of
the individual cases is necessary to understand the parameters of the
conflict.
A. Greenwald v. Commissioner.
Greenwald was an officer of Interstate Hosiery Mills, Inc., a pub-
licly held corporation. Interstate provided employees with a profit-shar-
ing trust, and Greenwald was a participant. In 1953, Interstate was sold
to Burlington Mills Corporation. Upon completion of the sale, fifty-nine
of the sixty employees participating in the profit-sharing trust received
distributions due to their separation from service. Only Greenwald re-
mained as a participant. No additional employer contributions were
made to the trust until 1959, when the trust entered into a reorganization
agreement with Fundamental Investors, Inc. The reorganization agree-
ment called for an exchange of the trust's assets for Fundamental stock.
The stock acquired by the trust was then distributed in full to Greenwald
in 1959.39
The IRS contended, and the Tax Court held, that the trust ceased to
be tax-exempt in 1953.40 The Tax Court concluded that no part of the
eventual distribution to Greenwald was eligible for preferential tax treat-
ment under section 402(a)(2) because the trust was not tax-exempt at the
time of distribution.41
On appeal, the Second Circuit agreed that the trust lost its tax ex-
sioner, 39 T.C.M. (CCH) 1022, 1025 (1980); Woodson v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 779, 786 (1980),
rev'd, 651 F.2d 1094 (5th Cir. Unit A July 1981).
35. 651 F.2d 1094, 1095-96 & n.3 (5th Cir. Unit A July 1981).
36. Id. at 1096.
37. Baetens v. Commissioner, 777 F.2d 1160, 1163-67 (6th Cir. 1985).
38. Benbow v. Commissioner, 774 F.2d 740, 743-45 (7th Cir. 1985).
39. Greenwald, 366 F.2d at 539-40.
40. Greenwald v. Commissioner, 44 T.C. 137, 148-49 (1965). The Tax Court held that the plan
was disqualified because it discriminated in favor of Greenwald, contrary to the standards set out in
section 401(a)(4), and because employer contributions ceased to be "recurring and substantial." Id.
at 149.
41. Greenwald, 44 T.C. at 149.
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empt status in 1953.42 However, it disagreed with the Tax Court's hold-
ing that loss of tax-exempt status by the trust should result in the
complete denial of preferential tax treatment for the distribution.43 The
Second Circuit advocated bifurcation of the trust into exempt and nonex-
empt portions. The distributions of each portion would be treated sepa-
rately, with the exempt distributions governed by section 402(a)(2) and
the nonexempt distributions governed by section 402(b).44
The court contended that this tax treatment was supported by the
year-by-year consideration of exempt status mentioned in the Code.45
Furthermore, the court found that section 402(a) did not directly address
the tax position of a previously qualified trust. In light of this perceived
ambiguity, the court concluded that it should afford the employee the
optimal tax position allowable. Finally, the court noted that bifurcation
of the trust was consistent with congressional intent "since it affords cap-
ital gains treatment only so long as a... trust remains nondiscriminatory
in operation." 46 This bifurcation would result in tax treatment of the
exempt portion of the distribution in parity with the tax treatment re-
ceived by the other employees upon separation from service.47 For these
reasons, the court concluded that preferential tax treatment should be
available for those funds distributed from the portion of the trust repre-
senting the pre-1953 contributions.48
42. Greenwald, 366 F.2d at 540. The court found the discriminatory nature of the trust to be
conclusive and did not consider other grounds for disqualification. Id. at 540-41.
43. Id. at 541.
44. Id.
45. Id. See I.R.C. § 402(b) (1982) (contributions includable in employee's gross income if
made during a taxable year of the employer ending "within or with a taxable year of the trust for
which the trust is not exempt from tax").
46. Greenwald, 366 F.2d at 541.
47. Id.
48. Id. Following Greenwald, but before the Fifth Circuit decided Woodson, three district
court cases addressed this issue. See Dudinsky v. United States, 78-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 1 9688,
at 85,300 (M.D. Fla. 1978); Pitt v. United States, 75-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9472, at 87,245 (M.D.
Fla. 1975); Hesse v. United States, 81-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9153, at 86,211-12 (E.D. Mo. 1980).
These cases-Pitt, Dudinsky, and Hesse-were all decided after the enactment of ERISA in
1974. Yet in none of these cases did the district court reexamine the Code in light of the new
legislation. Rather, the courts strictly, and in cursory fashion, adhered to the Second Circuit's ruling
in Greenwald. In the only case to bring new arguments to bear, Hesse, the holding focused on
equitable considerations rather than statutory interpretation or ERISA's statutory scheme. The
court emphasized the lack of control exercised by the employee over the trust. Hesse, 81-1 U.S. Tax
Cas. (CCH) at 86,211-12. The court found it unfair to "retroactively change the ground rules" on
which the employee had relied in planning for retirement. Id. at 85,212 (quoting Woodson v. Com-
missioner, 73 T.C. 779, 784 (1980), rev'd, 651 F.2d 1094 (5th Cir. Unit A July 1981)). In spite of the
recent enactment of ERISA, the court stated that Congress had not provided guidance in dealing
with previously qualified trusts and granted summary judgment for the employee, citing Greenwald.
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B. Woodson v. Commissioner.
In Woodson v. Commissioner4 9 the Tax Court followed the Second
Circuit's bifurcation approach. One judge filed a strong dissenting opin-
ion, however, offering four reasons why the date of fund distribution,
rather than the date of fund contribution, should be determinative of the
distribution's tax treatment. First, the dissent looked at the language of
the statute and found no support for bifurcating a trust into exempt and
nonexempt portions.50 The dissent noted that section 402(a)(2) limits
preferential tax treatment of lump-sum distributions to instances in
which the distribution flows from an employee trust that is exempt under
section 501(a). The dissent concluded that since all parties agreed that
the distribution did not flow from an exempt trust, section 402(b), which
provides for ordinary income treatment, should govern. 51
Second, the dissent found nothing in the legislative history to sup-
port bifurcation. 52 The dissent stated that none of the early Code revi-
sions indicated that the trust's funds should be divided between exempt
and nonexempt periods. Furthermore, rules for preferential tax treat-
ment for distributions from exempt trusts were provided before ERISA,
revised in great detail as part of ERISA, and amended in later tax legisla-
tion. Therefore, if Congress intended to allow bifurcation, it had ample
opportunity to so indicate.53 The dissent stated that through its continu-
ing legislation, Congress had explored alternative sanctions more sharply
focused than blanket disqualification, 54 but had retained disqualification
as appropriate in certain instances of pension fund mismanagement. 55
The dissent argued that the majority sought "to supply an alleged omis-
sion in the statute, on the basis of no examination of alternatives, no
opportunity for public comment, and no articulation of the method by
which the time-allocation of assets is to be made."'56
49. 73 T.C. 779, 784-86 (1980), rev'd, 651 F.2d 1094 (5th Cir. Unit A July 1981).
50. Id. at 787 (Chabot, J., dissenting).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 787-88.
53. Id. at 788.
54. Id. at 790 nn. 9-11. The Tax Reform Act of 1969 changed the penalties for certain viola-
tions by private foundations, replacing disqualification with an excise tax. Tax Reform Act of 1969,
Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 101(b), 83 Stat. 498. In certain instances, the excise tax was imposed on the
specific individual responsible for the violation. Id., 83 Stat. at 499-500. The Tax Reform Act of
1976 took similar action with respect to excess lobbying violations. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub.
L. No. 94-455, § 1307(b), 90 Stat. 1722. ERISA replaced disqualification with taxation in a number
of areas, including violations arising from excess contributions to "H.R. 10 plans," self-dealing,
underfunding, and failure to meet minimum vesting standards. ERISA § 1012, I.R.C. §§ 411, 4971,
4973(b), 4975(a) (1982).
55. Woodson, 73 T.C. at 789 (Chabot, J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 790.
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Third, the dissent pointed out that in several of the cases the em-
ployee requesting bifurcated treatment had been the plan's deci-
sionmaker and had been operating the pension plan for his own exclusive
benefit.57 The dissent argued that the majority holding could in effect
make it more tempting for a company officer to use a trust for his own
benefit, thereby undercutting legislation enacted to protect rank-and-file
employees.5 8
Finally, the dissent noted that calculating the amount of the distri-
bution subject to favorable tax treatment would be difficult under the
bifurcation approach.5 9 The bifurcation approach would allow employer
contributions to be divided into predisqualification and postdisqualifica-
tion portions. But administrative difficulties would arise because a por-
tion of the fund would be attributable to the earnings of both pre- and
postdisqualification contributions, and the majority's method of bifurca-
tion did not specify which tax treatment should apply to these earnings.
The dissent's concerns proved persuasive on appeal. Reversing the
Tax Court's decision, 60 the Fifth Circuit provided a number of reasons
for rejecting the Greenwald approach. The court declared that the statu-
tory language at issue was unambiguous and precluded bifurcation. 61
The court also found it significant that Congress had extensively revised
the Code's treatment of pension plans but had not altered 402(a)(1). 62
The court concluded that if Congress wished to avoid a possible inequita-
ble outcome, Congress itself, rather than the courts, should make the
necessary modification. 63 Finally, the court restated the administrative
and enforcement concerns raised by the dissent below.64
The Fifth Circuit forwarded an additional argument against the bi-
furcation approach. The court concluded that Treasury Regulation sec-
tion 1.402(a)-l(a)(1)(ii) 65 provided the key to interpreting section 402(a)
because the regulation clearly states that section 402(a) and its provision
for preferential tax treatment relate only to a trust that is exempt for the
taxable year in which the distribution is made.66 Supported by a recent
Supreme Court decision holding that courts should consider Treasury
57. Id. at 788-89.
58. Id. at 789-90.
59. Id. at 791. In the case of a deferred benefit plan, the accurate allocation of funds would
become even more complex.
60. Woodson v. Commissioner, 651 F.2d 1094, 1095-96 (5th Cir. Unit A July 1981).
61. Id. at 1095-96.
62. Id. at 1095 n.4.
63. Id. at 1096.
64. Id. at 1095 n.4.
65. This regulation has not been changed since Woodson. Compare Treas. Reg. § 1.402(a)-
l(a)(1)(ii) (1966) with 26 C.F.R. § 1.402(a)-l(a)(1)(ii) (1986).
66. Woodson, 651 F.2d at 1096.
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regulations valid if they implement the congressional mandate in some
reasonable fashion,67 the court determined that the Treasury regulation
was valid and conclusive on the issue.
The Tax Court now found itself faced with a split in the circuits:
the Second Circuit in Greenwald had held that the status of the trust at
the time of contribution controlled the tax treatment of the later distribu-
tion, while, the Fifth Circuit in Woodson had held that the trust's status
at the time of distribution was controlling. The Tax Court is free to fol-
low either line of reasoning 68 and has consistently followed the Green-
wald approach.69 In two cases, however, the United States Courts of
Appeals for the Sixth 70 and the Seventh71 Circuits have reversed the Tax
67. Rowan Cos. v. United States, 452 U.S. 247, 252 (1981).
68. The Tax Court is compelled to follow the precedent of a United States Court of Appeals
only in cases appealable to that court. See Golsen v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 742, 756-57 (1970),
aff'd, 445 F.2d 985, 990 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 940 (1971).
69. See Woodson, 73 T.C. at 786; Sturdivant v. Commissioner, 39 T.C.M. (CCH) 1022, 1025
(1980); Baetens v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 152, 155 (1984), rev'd, 777 F.2d 1160 (6th Cir. 1985);
Benbow v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 941, 947 (1984), rev'd, 774 F.2d 740 (7th Cir. 1985); Boggs v.
Commissioner, 83 T.C. 132, 152-53 (1984), vacated on other grounds, 784 F.2d 1166 (4th Cir. 1986).
70. Baetens v. Commissioner, 777 F.2d 1160 (6th Cir. 1985). In Baetens, an employee and
shareholder received a lump-sum distribution from the profit-sharing trust in 1977. He rolled over
the entire amount into an IRA. The distribution was attributable to employer contributions prior to
1974. In 1979, the IRS retroactively revoked the trust's exempt status as of March 31, 1974. Id. at
1161. The distribution was therefore composed entirely of contributions made while the pension was
exempt.
The Tax Court followed the reasoning it had outlined three years earlier in Woodson and con-
cluded that the employee's entire distribution would be accorded favorable tax treatment. Baetens v.
Commissioner, 82 T.C. 152, 170 (1984).
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit characterized the case as a "classic conflict of equity and statutory
intent." In a detailed opinion, the court refuted the Tax Court's supposition that the history of
recent legislation on the issue was overwhelmingly pro-employee. Although it recognized that an
important goal of Congress was the protection of pension funds, the court noted that Congress was
equally concerned with regulating the pension fund area. Baetens, 777 F.2d at 1164-66. The court
found the language of the statutes unambiguous, and concluded that "the statute allows special tax
treatment under section 402(a)(5) only to plan participants who receive distributions from plans and
trusts qualified at the time of the distribution." Id. at 1167.
71. Benbow v. Commissioner, 774 F.2d 740, 744-46 (7th Cir. 1985). The Tax Court had ad-
hered to its reasoning in Woodson and Baetens and allowed tax-free rollover into an IRA of that
portion of the distribution allocable to contributions made prior to the retroactive date of disqualifi-
cation. Benbow v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 941, 947-48 (1984). The nonqualified portion of the
rollover was subject to the excise tax under 26 U.S.C. § 4973 (1982). Benbow, 82 T.C. at 948.
Echoing the conclusion of the Fifth Circuit in Woodson, the Seventh Circuit held that the lan-
guage of the statutes and the Treasury regulation required denial of tax benefits, and that any divi-
sion of the trust into qualified and nonqualified components would be improper. Benbow, 774 F.2d
at 744-45. Although the results seemed somewhat harsh, the Seventh Circuit held that the statute
must be enforced as written by Congress. Id. at 745.
The Fourth Circuit was recently presented a case involving the same issue. See Boggs v. Com-
missioner, 784 F.2d 1166 (4th Cir. 1986). The Tax Court held that an employee was eligible to
rollover that portion of the distribution allocable to contributions made before the date of retroactive
disqualification. Boggs v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 132, 151-52 (1986). The Fourth Circuit reversed
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Court, rejecting the Greenwald approach and adopting the Fifth Circuit's
approach.
III. STATUTORY ANALYSIS, LEGISLATIVE SCHEME, AND EQUITABLE
CONSIDERATIONS
Given the conflict among the circuits regarding the correct applica-
tion of sections 402(a) and 402(b), a close examination of the Code sec-
tions, the legislative scheme, and relevant equitable considerations is
indicated. Whether the tax treatment of the lump-sum payment should
be tied to the date of fund contribution or distribution could be eluci-
dated by one or more of these factors.
A. Sections 402(a) and 402(b) Are Not Ambiguous.
The Code sections that deal with the taxation of lump-sum distribu-
tions take a year-by-year approach in determining whether a pension
plan is qualified or nonqualified and outline the appropriate tax treat-
ment in either case. Section 402(a) stipulates preferential tax treatment
of a distribution "which is exempt from tax under section 501(a)." 72
This phrase is repeated in the provision discussing capital gains treat-
ment for funds contributed before January 1, 1974 (section 402(a)(2)), in
the provision describing eligibility for rollover (section
402(a)(5)(D)(i)(II), which refers to subsection (e)(4)(A)), and in the pro-
vision defining a qualified lump-sum distribution (section 402(e)(4)(A)).
Section 402(b) stipulates ordinary income treatment for any distribution
for any trust "not exempt from tax under section 501(a)." 73
At issue is the precise meaning of "is exempt." The Second Circuit
interpreted the clause to mean exempt at the time of contribution. 74 The
Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits have strongly stated that the phrase
must mean exempt at the time of distribution. 75 Each interpretation is
plausible on its face. The "exempt at time of contribution" interpretation
appears to be bolstered by the year-by-year approach in section 402(b)
for determining exempt status. But the year-by-year approach is more
logically applied in the case of a nonexempt trust that becomes exempt,
the Tax Court's decision on the basis of a different issue-that the commissioner had abused his
discretion in applying the disqualification retroactively-and did not reach the issue of how the
distribution would be taxed. Boggs, 784 F.2d at 1169-70.
72. I.R.C. § 402(a)(1) (1982).
73. I.R.C. § 402(b) (1982).
74. Greenwald v. Commissioner, 366 F.2d 538, 541 (2d Cir. 1966).
75. Baetens v. Commissioner, 777 F.2d 1160, 1166 (6th Cir. 1985); Benbow v. Commissioner,
774 F.2d 740, 744 (7th Cir. 1985); Woodson v. Commissioner, 651 F.2d 1094, 1095 (5th Cir. Unit A
July 1981).
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because it remedies the double taxation that would otherwise occur.76
Futhermore, Treasury Regulation section 402(b)-l(c)(1) eliminates
any ambiguity in section 402(a), and strongly supports the interpretation
embraced by the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits. The regulation links
the taxation of the distribution to exemption under section 501(a) for the
taxable year in which the distribution is made.77 Thus, section 402(a) is
not ambiguous and the status of the trust at the time of distribution,
rather than at the time of contribution, should be determinative of the tax
treatment of the lump-sum distribution.
B. The Legislative Scheme.
The comprehensive legislative scheme regarding pension plans and
Congress's failure to amend section 402(a) provide support for rejecting
the bifurcation approach. Congress wanted to encourage the growth of
both pension plans and retirement savings by the private sector.78 How-
ever, Congress was also extremely concerned with the abuses it saw in its
survey of private pension plans, and attempted to remedy these abuses
76. The employee would otherwise be taxed once under section 402(b) when the contributions
were made and again under section 402(a) at the time of distribution.
77. Treas. Reg. § 1.402(b)-l(c)(1) (1978).
78. Congressional debate prior to the enactment of ERISA demonstrates Congress's desire to
encourage pension saving. H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4639, 4643. In particular, Congress intended that the employee's right to
the pension funds be protected through increased vesting proportionate with length of service. The
report stated: "[in its final analysis, the issue basically resolves itself into whether workers, after
many years of labor, whose jobs terminate voluntarily or otherwise, should be denied benefits that
have been placed for them in a fund for retirement purposes." H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. 6, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4639, 4644-45. Congress also wanted
to ensure portability-the ability to transfer vested funds from one exempt pension fund to another.
H.R. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 341, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
5038, 5121. This goal was particularly evident in the Senate's proposal to establish a central porta-
bility fund, which was to serve as a conduit for transfer of pension dollars when the employee
changed jobs. S. REP. No. 383, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. 74-78, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 4890, 4958-62.
Although Congress eventually replaced the central portability fund with the IRA, the Senate's
discussion of the proposed fund is enlightening because it evinces an intent that tax treatment should
stem from the trust's status at the time of the distribution:
The central fund may receive transfers only from employee benefit plans (or from employ-
ees receiving final distributions from these plans) that are qualified under the Internal Rev-
enue Code. If the fund receives notice from the Secretary of the Treasury that a final
determination has been made that a plan was not qualified at the time that a transfer was
made to the fund, the balance of each participant's account attributable to transfers from
that plan (in the year the plan is not qualified) will be paid from the fund to the participant.
The amount paid is to be included in the participant's income in the year it is paid to the
participant. This generally follows present law, since plan participants currently are taxed
as receiving ordinary income when they receive transfers from plans which are not quali-
fied in the year of distribution.
S. REP. No. 383, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 75, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws
4890, 4959.
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through comprehensive regulation and standardization of the plans.79
Although it was not unmindful of the harsh effects that attend loss of
exempt status, Congress retained disqualification as an appropriate sanc-
tion80 for failure to meet minimum standards.8t Recognizing that dis-
qualification would impose a hardship on employees, Congress provided
excise tax penalties as sanctions for certain prohibited transactions in the
management of trusts in order that abuses could be cured without dis-
qualification.8 2 Because the study of private pension planning was thor-
ough, and the resulting ERISA legislation detailed, Congress must be
viewed as having spoken decisively on the standards and sanctions it
wished to establish.
In addition, Congress has continued to fine-tune the Code provisions
dealing with employee pension plans since the enactment of ERISA.
Congress has made many recent major amendments to the Code, includ-
ing the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, the Deficit
79. See H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 9-10, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 4639, 4647-48. This report stated:
Underlying the provisions of this Act is a recognition of the necessity for a compre-
hensive legislative program dealing not only with malfeasance and maladministration in
the plans, or the consequences of lack of adequate vesting, but also with the broad spec-
trum of questions such as adequacy of funding, plant shut downs and plan terminations,
adequate communication to participants, and, in short, the establishment of certain mini-
mum standards to which all private pension plans must conform if the private pension
promise is to become real rather than illusory.
IaL
80. See S. REP. No. 383, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 94-95, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWs 4890, 4978. This report stated:
Under present law, a trust forming part of a qualified retirement plan loses its exemp-
tion from taxation if it engages in a prohibited transaction. With loss of exemption, special
tax benefits relating to qualified plans also may be denied, including deferral of taxation by
employees and loss of deductions by employers contributing to the trust. In practice these
sanctions have not been satisfactory in discouraging prohibited transactions....
In addition, the present law's sanctions for engaging in prohibited transactions tend to
fall upon innocent employees. For example, if a trust is disqualified because of an act of the
trustee and the employer, the income tax imposed upon a disqualified plan may be paid out
of funds otherwise available to provide employees' retirement benefits. Furthermore, be-
cause of the prohibited act of an employer and trustee, an employee may have to pay tax on
contributions made on his behalf before he actually receives the amounts attributable to the
contributions. This possible loss to innocent employees has caused the Service to be reluc-
tant to impose the sanctions.
To resolve these problems, the committee bill changes the method of enforcing the
prohibited transaction rules. It imposes sanctions for prohibited transactions upon the par-
ties in interest and fiduciaries who engage in these transactions in place of the sanctions
now imposed on the employee benefit trusts.
Id.
81. See S. REP. No. 383, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 94-95, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 4890, 4978.
82. See supra note 54 and accompanying text. In a recent case, the Tax Court held that the
excise tax penalty provisions of ERISA do not preclude the IRS from disqualifying a plan if there is
evidence of a pattern of prohibited transactions. Winger's Dep't Store, Inc. v. Commissioner, 82
T.C. 869, 887 (1984).
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Reduction Act of 1984, and the Tax Reform Act of 1986.83 Congress has
had ample opportunity to review section 402(a) and clarify any perceived
ambiguities. Yet Congress has never advocated bifurcation of trusts into
exempt and nonexempt portions or bifurcation of lump-sum distributions
into portions qualifying for preferential tax treatment and portions to be
taxed as ordinary income.
C. Inapplicability of Equitable Considerations.
The Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits have stated forthrightly that
equitable considerations must be ignored in interpreting a clearly worded
tax statute. 84 The Second Circuit and the Tax Court, however, have been
moved by consideration of three equitable arguments in support of the
bifurcation approach.8 5 First, the bifurcation approach is said to lessen
the harsh result of denial of preferential tax benefits for the employee
who did not participate in or contribute to the fund mismanagement.
Second, the bifurcation approach is said to prevent inequitable treatment
between two participants of the same disqualified plan who contributed
funds during an identical time span, but who received the distribution at
different times-one just prior to, and the other just after disqualification.
Third, it is said to preclude the extension of the reach of the disqualifica-
tion to a date long before the event that triggered the disqualification.
The denial of preferential tax treatment for distributions made after
the date of disqualification will unquestionably have inequitable effects.
First, the effects of disqualification are devastating to the employee, 86 in
terms of both the immediate taxes owed and the probable reduction in
the standard of living during retirement. This result seems especially
harsh when that employee is an innocent party; the employee will be
penalized even though he had no input in the decisions made by trust
management.8 7 In part to avoid the harshness of total disqualification of
the distribution, the Second Circuit and the Tax Court have adopted the
bifurcation approach.
Not only does "all or nothing" disqualification create a harsh result,
but the penalty of disqualification and the resulting loss of tax benefits
fall unevenly among employees in the same plan. An employee who re-
83. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
84. See Baetens v. Commissioner, 777 F.2d 1160, 1164, 1167 (6th Cir. 1985); Benbow v. Com-
missioner, 774 F.2d 740, 744 (7th Cir. 1985); Woodson v. Commissioner, 651 F.2d 1094, 1095-96 &
n.4 (5th Cir. Unit A July 1981).
85. See Greenwald v. Commissioner, 366 F.2d 538, 541 (2d Cir. 1966); Baetens v. Commis-
sioner, 82 T.C. 152, 167 (1984), rev'd, 777 F.2d 1160 (6th Cir. 1985); Woodson v. Commissioner, 73
T.C. 779, 784 (1980), rev'd, 651 F.2d 1094 (5th Cir. Unit A July 1981).
86. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
87. See Woodson, 73 T.C. at 784.
1070 [Vol. 1986:1055
L UMP-SUM DISTRIBUTIONS
ceives a distribution prior to the an IRS determination of disqualification
retains all the tax benefits promised at the time of contribution. The em-
ployee who retires after the retroactive adverse determination loses
favorable tax treatment not only for contributions made after disqualifi-
cation, but also for those contributions made before disqualification. It is
precisely this inequitable treatment of members of the same plan that the
Second Circuit sought to avoid when it adopted the bifurcation approach
in Greenwald.
The third inequity linked to the complete disqualification of a lump-
sum distribution results from the retroactive nature of an IRS disqualifi-
cation. The Commissioner is granted the power to apply an adverse de-
termination retroactively, unless such retroactive application would
amount to a clear abuse of discretion. 8 Under the Greenwald approach,
the effects of retroactive disqualification reach back to the date of the
event that triggered disqualification; the denial of tax benefits is therefore
retroactive to the point of mismanagement. But when the courts follow
the Woodson approach, the disqualification reaches even farther back in
time, to the point when the funds were contributed. Preferential tax
treatment is lost not from the date of adjudication or the date when the
mismanagement occurred, but from the date when the contribution was
made. The retroactive reach of an IRS disqualification in effect predates
any mismanagement or prohibited activity. The result to the employee is
the same as if the trust had been disqualified from the date of the first
contribution. This result obtains notwithstanding the employee's good
faith reliance on the tax-exempt nature of the trust and the benefits that
would accrue at retirement.
The Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits recognized the unfair effect of
their decisions on the individual employee.89 These courts, however,
were more concerned with the broader class of pension participants; they
believed that adopting the bifurcated approach would encourage abuse
by pension fund fiduciaries. Under the bifurcated approach, a deci-
sionmaker/plan participant can enhance his own fortune with little risk
of substantial loss of tax benefits since he can withdraw most of his ac-
count from the plan as a tax-favored lump-sum distribution should he
happen to get caught.90
88. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
89. See Baetens v. Commissioner, 777 F.2d 1160, 1164 (6th Cir. 1985); Benbow v. Commis-
sioner, 774 F.2d 740, 744 (7th Cir. 1985); Woodson v. Commissioner, 651 F.2d 1094, 1095 (5th Cir.
Unit A July 1981).
90. See Woodson v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 779, 789 (1980) (Chabot, J. dissenting), rev'd, 651
F.2d 1094 (5th Cir. Unit A July 1981). Indeed, several of the employees involved in suits on this
issue have been in the position of the decisionmaker. Greenwald and Woodson both were fiduciaries
of the trust funds later retroactively disqualified. See Greenwald v. Commissioner, 366 F.2d 538,
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This trade-off of an inequity to an individual for the protection of a
greater class of participants occurs in a related area of the law: tax treat-
ment of charitable organizations. Organizations qualifying as tax-ex-
empt under section 501(c)(3) also are closely monitored by the IRS and
periodically audited. If such an organization engages in a prohibited ac-
tivity, such as lobbying, 91 that organization will be disqualified and will
lose its tax exempt status. Both third parties contributing to that organi-
zation and the final beneficiary of funds contributed to the organization
will be prejudiced as a result of disqualification. Those parties who have
contributed to the organization will lose the tax deduction their contribu-
tion would have triggered, and the final beneficiary of the charitable or-
ganization (such as an art museum) will be hurt by the resulting loss of
contributions. Nonetheless, the disqualification is made because it en-
sures greater fairness-in the enforcement of minimum standards for char-
itable organizations as a whole. The entire nonprofit sector is protected
as a result.92
The same idea of protecting the broader good, even when one result
is hardship to the individual, applies to pension fund taxation. Although
balancing the equities in this pension tax arena is difficult, the individual
employee is best protected by the policy that most strongly deters abuse
of the fund by the employer. With pension funds, as with charitable or-
ganizations, the strongest deterrent is disqualification. Courts should not
be so overcome with sympathy for the individual employee that they ig-
nore the legislative directive to protect the broader class of pension
participants.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Greenwald interpretation has no support within the Code. The
unambiguous language characterizes a trust fund as either exempt or
nonexempt. Treasury Regulation section 1.402(a)(1)(ii) reinforces this
meaning by limiting favored tax treatment to a trust that is exempt for
the taxable year in which the distribution is made. The Fifth, Sixth, and
Seventh Circuits are justified in stating that Congress clearly intended an
539-40 (2d Cir. 1966); Woodson, 73 T.C. at 780. Evidence of discriminatory management by the
employee was also apparent in Epstein v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 439, 443-44 (1978).
91. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1982). See generally, Gallagher & Jarchow, How to Organize and Meet
the Tax Requirements of Public Charities and Private Foundations, 8 TAX'N FOR LAW. 302 (1980);
Temple & Gorbaty, How to Properly Obtain and Maintain Tax-Exempt Status for a Charitable Or-
ganization, 14 TAX'N FOR LAW. 16 (1985).
92. But a difference can exist between the employee's interest in the pension fund and a third
party's interest in a charitable fund. The employee's interest in the pension fund becomes a vested
one, i.e., a legally recognized fixed right to future enjoyment of his portion of the trust. The benefici-
ary of a charitable trust has no such vested interest.
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all-or-nothing interpretation. None of the congressional reports sur-
rounding the enactment of ERISA support the bifurcation approach.
And despite almost yearly amendments to the Code-including three
major revisions, the last in 1986-no changes have been made in the lan-
guage of 402(a) or (b). Congress has had many opportunities to indicate
that an intent to allow bifurcation, yet it has failed to do so.
The bifurcation approach gives rise to the problem of defining what
portion of the fund is predisqualification and what portion of the fund is
postdisqualification. It is difficult enough to trace back annual contribu-
tions; it is even more difficult to apportion the earnings attributable to
those contributions. When faced with a defined benefit plan (where the
employer does not provide a fixed formula for making contributions, but
rather a predetermined final benefit), accurate allocation of funds would
become even more complex.
Congress did not intend this complex bifurcation of a single trust.
Rather, it has retained disqualification as the best deterrent of fund mis-
management. The courts must recognize their responsibility to follow
the legislative directive set out in the Code. Sections 402(a) and (b)
should be given their literal interpretation. The courts must look beyond
the inequities worked in individual cases and give full effect to congres-
sional intent. Congress, not the courts, must alleviate the perceived
harshness of section 402.
Ann Marie Nader
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